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The decade of the 1980s will likely be remembered for the rapid escalation of
the national debt and the unsuccessful attempts to harness it. President Reagan's
stated strategies for dealing with the national debt focused on policies for
stimulating the economy and reducing the size of the government. His desire to
reduce the size of the govemment excluded the Department of Defense, which he
determined needed real growth in order to restore the military strength he felt had
been lost in prior administrations. In February 1988, for the first time in his tenure
and partially as a result of the 1987 Economic Summit between the Legislative and
Executive Branches, the President submitted a budget calhng for only a 3% increase
in defense spending. This increase, which was not expected to cover the cost of
inflation, translated into a real loss in defense dollars.
Even with the growth of the defense budget enjoyed in the first half of the
decade, the Department of Defense did not escape fiscal scrutiny. Stories of vastly
overpriced ashtrays and hammers shocked the public and brought Congressional
attention. The focus on fiscal management became sharper and policy statements by
the Service Secretaries indicated that military leaders would henceforth be made
more directly responsible for the efficient use of public resources entrusted to them.
An annual budget of nearly four and a half billion dollars for ship maintenance
and modernization provides a substantial target for cost reduction programming
within the Department of the Navy. The Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA)
is responsible for the administration of these funds, which are allocated
approximately 70 percent to public and 30 percent to private sector shipyards.
Through the early 1980s, the prioritized goal of naval shipyards was 1) on time
delivery of 2) quality work at 3) a reasonable cost. Cost awareness held the lowest
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priority. The advent of increasing budgetary restrictions brought cost
consciousness to the forefront and instigated new NAVSEA directives aimed at
forcing the shipyards to make cost effectiveness as important or even more
important than meeting schedule. Although there have been numerous other
initiatives that addressed cost reduction, NAVSEA's requirement that each shipyard
implement a Cost and Schedule Control System (C/SCS) is the most prominent
shipyard program instituted to date.
B. PURPOSE
The purpose of this research is to define the implementation of a Cost and
Schedule Control System (C/SCS) at the Mare Island Naval Shipyard and to evaluate
its effectiveness in meeting the objectives stated in its title.
A naval shipyard is a huge and complex activity. Like a giant jigsaw puzzle, it is
made up of many irregular pieces, each shaped by internal and external constraints.
These pieces must fit together to form a recognizable picture of a productive
activity. Any new tool introduced must fit into this puzzle. Therefore, some of the
previously existing methods of determining budgeted costs and schedules must be
examined and analyzed. Then C/SCS, the new management tool, can be defined and
studied.
Specific questions addressed in this research are:
1
.
What is the cmrent status of the implementation of a Cost and Schedule
Control System at Mare Island Naval Shipyard (MINSY)?
2. How does MINSY currently estimate direct labor requirements?
3. Are the data inputs to the system accurate?
4. Are the performance indicators generated valid?
5. Do the generated reports provide useful and timely information to all levels of
management?
C. SCOPE
Every naval shipyard is required to have a Cost and Schedule Control System by
April 1988, but there is no requirement for uniformity among the yards. In order
to maintain a reasonable scope, this research is limited to the implementation efforts
at Mare Island Naval Shipyard. This limitation allows for sufficient depth of study
needed to provide a meaningful assessment of the system to answer the research
questions listed previously. This research was not sponsored by any activity.
Travel funds were provided from the very limited pool owned by the
Administrative Sciences Curricular Office. Travel to the Shipyard, therefore was
limited to four days. Initial research to establish a basic understanding of this most
complex organization required the majority of available time. Additionally,
management time which we could reasonably expect to monopolize in support of
our inquiries was limited since this research was not sponsored by any NAVSEA
activity. This limitation is most evident in Chapter VI where we discuss
management perceptions of the C/SCS. Interviews with a significant number of line
managers would have required considerable manhours of expensive management
time, and more time at the Shipyard than the Curricular Office's limited funds
would allow. Admittedly, then, this thesis only scratches the surface of a very
complicated control system in a most complex organization.
Discussion of specific work items is limited to non-nuclear repair work only so
that the research may remain unclassified. There are some major differences in
nuclear and non-nuclear work practices, but they are beyond the scope of this
research. A background section describing shipyard organization, budgeting and
some of the operating constraints is provided to enable the reader to better
understand the shipyard environment.
D. RESEARCH TECHNIQUE
The research effort included some background reading but consisted primarily
of field interviews with key shipyard personnel and the gathering of reports and
other data. There have been several consultant studies of the shipyards and a
number of Naval Postgraduate School theses have addressed various aspects of
operations at the shipyards. However, none of these studies have directly addressed
the Cost and Schedule Control System. The majority of the background readings
were instructions, notices and other navy source documents. Both authors visited
the shipyard on several occasions and received generous cooperation from those
interviewed. Shipyard personnel provided further assistance by commenting on the
accuracy of the research as it progressed.
E. OUTLINE OF THE THESIS ORGANIZATION
Chapter II provides a general overview of the workings of a naval shipyard,
including its organization and financial structure, some of the unique constraints
within which it must operate, and a description of some other recent changes that
were implemented in an attempt to increase cost awarenes.
Chapter III describes the Cost and Schedule Control System implemented at
the Mare Island Naval Shipyard and discusses the compliance of that system with
NAVSEA requirements. Chapter IV continues the discussion with an examination
of current shipyard cost estimation procedures which result in the budgeted
amounts used in the C/SCS.
Chapter V provides an analysis of the system, addressing the validity of the
performance indicators and the usefulness of the reports. Chapter VI reports on
management perception and acceptance of the system. Chapter VII summarizes the
research with recommendations for improvements to the system and identification




The purpose of this chapter is to provide the reader with an introduction to the
mission, organization and the financial structure of naval shipyards. It also offers
an abbreviated look at some of the initiatives undertaken since 1980 to improve
financial management within naval shipyards.
There are currently eight naval shipyards, down from eleven since World War
n. The official mission of naval shipyards assigned by the Secretary of the Navy is:
To provide logistic support for assigned ships and service craft; to perform
authorized work in connection with construction, conversion, overhaul, repair,
alteration, dry-docking, and outfitting of ships and craft, as assigned; to perform
manufacturing, research, and test work, as assigned; and to provide services and
material to other activities and units, as directed by competent authority. [Ref
.
1]
In the recent past all ship construction was removed from the public sector,
leaving as the primary mission of naval shipyards the repair and upgrade of Navy
ships and the preservation of a "surge" capability in case of war. [Ref. 2]
NAVSEA has reduced the generality of the shipyards' missions by assigning
tasks specifically suited to each yard's capabilities and facilities. For example. Mare
Island primarily provides for the repair, overhaul and refueling of nuclear powered
submarines.
B. SHIPYARD ORGANIZATION
The majority of this research involves activities performed in the Production
and Planning Departments. Figure 1 provides a condensed organizational chart for














































Figure 1. Production Department Organization
The Production Officer reports to the Shipyard Commander on all productive
activity. His primary assistant, the Repair Officer, provides the overall direction on
total work accomplishment. The Group Superintendents also report to the
Production Officer. Each Group Superintendent is responsible for a number of
shops which make up a major trade or work area. For instance, the Mechanical
Group consists of the Inside and Outside Machine Shops as well as several other
related shops.
At least two Ship Superintendents are assigned to each ship to direct productive
work specific to that hull. The Ship Superintendents report to the Repair Officer.
The Production Control Branch Head, also reporting to the Repair Officer, is
responsible for workload, work force and schedule management. The
responsibility for designing and implementing the C/SCS was assigned to the
Production Control Branch.
Figure 2 displays the key divisions of the Planning Department and provides an
indication of how large this department is. The planners and estimators provide the
initial estimate of mandays needed to accomplish a particular work package. The
process is very complex and cannot be adequately described in a few paragraphs. A

















































Figure 2. Planning Department Organization
C. THE NAVY INDUSTRIAL FUND
Naval shipyards' operating funds come primarily from the Navy Industrial
Fund (NIF). The NIP was established by Congress to provide a more "businesslike"
8
approach to industrial activities and to bypass the need for annual appropriation of
funds. The NIF was provided with a corpus, or revolving fund, of working capital
which supports the activity. The fund is used to finance operations until payment
has been received from the customer. The financial goal of every NDR activity is to
break even, to have revenues equal costs.
The NIF was intended to provide better management as the result of three
primary features. First, there must be a contractual relationship between the
customer and the activity so that the customer can budget for expenditures and the
activity can define the task, accurately estimate the cost, and properly schedule work
force and material requirements. Secondly, NIF requires a cost accounting
approach which relates cost to specific jobs. And finally, the NIF provides
flexibility by being freed from the Congressional appropriation cycle.
The cost flow cycle of the NIF is demonstrated in Figure 3. As demonstrated,
all costs of production, direct and indirect, as well as general and administrative
expenses are financed by the NEF. The NIF activity bills the customer for the work
and the revenue is used to replenish the fund.
Though the NIF itself is exempt from Congressional appropriation, the
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Figure 3. NIF Cycle
D. SHIPYARD BUDGETING
The shipyard prepares an Annual Financial Management Budget (AFMB) based
on budget guidance from NAVSEA. The AFMB is developed by matching
customer needs and resources to shipyard capacity, capability and costs. Planned
workload is translated into various accounting classifications such as direct or
indirect labor. Dollar values are assigned to each account in accordance with
10
guidelines established by the Comptroller of the Navy (NAVCOMPT) and
NAVSEA.
The AFMB is reviewed by NAVSEA and, after negotiated adjustments,
combined with AFMB's of the other shipyards into a single NAVSEA shipyard
activity group budget. This budget is submitted to NAVCOMPT which holds
hearings and marks the budget. Reclamas are made by NAVSEA. On completion
of that level of review, NAVCOMPT provides the consolidated Department of the
Navy (DON) budget to the Secretary of Defense and to the Office of Management
and Budget. It is finally submitted as part of the Presidential Budget to Congress.
Therefore, the approved budget may be significantly different from the one
originally submitted by the shipyard.
E. UNIQUE SHIPYARD CONSTRAINTS
Naval Shipyards, like other large industrial organizations, operate under a
number of constraints. Common constraints include limited physical and capital
resources. Other constraints are formed by laws, regulations and direction from
higher authority. Naval Shipyards differ from commercial activities in that they
are required to budget billing rates at least two years in advance and they are often
limited in their ability to accept or dechne specific work packages.
The stabihzed manday rate is a product of the AFMB. The Defense Department
requirement for rate stabilization was intended to permit customers to plan for
funding a specific level of work without having to worry about cost escalation.
Activities develop a basic stabilized manday rate which includes a direct labor rate
adjusted for anticipated inflation and overtime usage, and an overhead rate which
includes indirect labor and all other overhead expenses. This basic rate is adjusted
by NAVSEA and DOD factors which are designed, in part, to provide payback for
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capital equipment used and to develop a fund for acquiring future capital assets.
The resulting stabilized manday rate is usually approved at least two years prior to
the fiscal year in which it will be applied. Once a rate is in effect for a ship, it
remains in effect until the repair period ends, even if more than one fiscal year is
involved. After approval, shipyards cannot change rates without Defense
Department approval, which is rarely attempted. The requirement for rate
stabilization is a significant constraint on the shipyard commander's ability to
control the profitability and finances of his activity.
The workload used in developing the AFMB is based on customer needs
identified by the Chief of Naval Operations, NAVSEA and the Type Commanders.
This workload forecast is also used to determine work force size and mix of skills.
Changes in fleet operational commitments, unplanned damage repairs, changes in
the size or mix (nuclear versus non-nuclear) of work packages and many other
emergent factors routinely impact the amount and type of work that is actually
undertaken in a given fiscal year. Thus, in addition to having little control over the
rates he may charge, the Shipyard Commander is severely limited in his ability to
control the amount and type of work his activity will receive.
The shipyard receives an Overhaul Work Package (OWP) for each ship
approximately one and a half to two years prior to the commencement of an
overhaul. Actual cost estimation for the particular project begins at this point.
Chapter IV discusses this process in detail. Actual work schedules associated with
the overhaul are also developed at this point. The schedules incorporate plans for
the most efficient use of the available resources. Detailing the scheduling of work is
beyond the scope of this research. However, it should be noted that changes in work
scope, such as those discussed in the paragraph above, are common. The impact of
these changes on regularly scheduled work often drastically influences subsequent
activity. The additional unscheduled work usually delays work already in progress.
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However, the shipyard is often compelled to finish the scheduled work as planned
because of the operational commitments of the ship. Applying additional labor and
increasing the use of overtime to meet schedule adds to the cost of the overhaul.
F. FISCAL INITIATIVES
NAVSEA recognized the political and economic factors discussed in Chapter I.
In its Naval Shipyard Corporate Business and Strategy Plan (NSCBSP), NAVSEA
indicated that cost must become as important as schedule in the shipyards'
accomplishment of their mission.
...Although substantial increases in defense spending were incurred, recent
concern with the national deficit will most likely continue to make defense
money difficult to obtain. ...There will be more and more governmental
attention paid to the affordability of the Navy. Increased efficiency will be
demanded. The...reduction in Navy shipyard maintenance money in FY-87, and
the recent analysis of shipyard NIF (Navy Industrial Fund) management are the
beginning of a move toward cost consciousness, as opposed to accomplishing
overhauls in the shortest time possible. [Ref. 3]
There have been numerous initiatives undertaken to improve financial
management and cost control in the shipyards. The Navy contracted with the firm
of Coopers and Lybrand to perform a complete management study of it's Navy
Industrial Fund Activities. Within NAVSEA, some new programs were directed
prior to the Coopers and Lybrand study, but most changes occurred after the release
of the study.
Many of the recent directives issued by NAVSEA are discussed in the
Headquarters Business Plan for Naval Shipyard Operation Improvement
(attachment 2 to the NAVSEA NSCBSP). These directives apply to all eight
shipyards but in many cases specific guidance is not provided, making
implementation an individual effort rather than uniform shipyard wide. A few of
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the most visible changes are discussed below. Any implementation efforts
mentioned are those of Mare Island Naval Shipyard (MINSY) unless otherwise
indicated.
In November 1985, the Commander of NAVSEA issued a letter stating that the
role of the Comptroller at naval shipyards should be enhanced. The Coopers and
Lybrand study had indicated that the comptroller was merely serving in a
transaction and recording function. The Commander stated his conviction that the
Comptroller should be providing financial analyses, projections and advice to the
shipyard Commanders to guide them into appropriate channels of inquiry and to aid
in management decisions. He directed the institution of a functional training course
for instructing comptrollers and other key financial personnel in the unique aspects
of shipyard comptroUership. He also discussed the creation of a cost analysis section
within the comptroller department and the establishment of an additional military
billet at the Lieutenant Commander/Commander level. The officer would serve as
assistant section leader to a senior civilian who would provide continuity. This
section would provide cost and budgeting analysis, and its military billet would
serve as a training ground for future shipyard comptrollers.
MINSY established the Cost Analysis Section in February 1986. It is currendy
staffed with four cost analysts at the GM-12 level and headed by a senior cost analyst
at the GM-13 level. The incumbents average over 15 years service in the shipyard
and have planning, scheduling, estimating and production control in their
backgrounds. According to the current shipyard comptroller, he plans to keep this
section "hungry" and productive by limiting individual tenure to under three years
with replacements continually coming in from the field. MINSY has also received
the additional military billet. The incumbent is a Lieutenant who is a recent
graduate of the Naval Postgraduate School with a degree in Financial Management.
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In an effort to force cost reduction, the Secretary of the Navy implemented the
Efficiency Improvement Program, which cut 500 million dollars from the FY-87
program without reducing the amount of work to be accomplished. NAVSEA
apportioned the cut to the individual shipyards. MINSY's portion of the cut was
$57.2 million. The cut essentially resulted in lower manday billing rates for all
availabilities started in 1987, and equated to a 17% reduction from previously
approved rates. The lower rates were continued in 1988.
The most dominant and visible change directed by NAVSEA was the
requirement to establish a Cost and Schedule Control System. The theory and
application of that system at MINSY is the subject of the next chapter.
15
m. COST SCHEDULE CONTROL SYSTEM
A. NAVSEA GUIDANCE ON C/SCS
In December 1984, NAVSEA issued NAVSEAINST 7000.13. The instruction
directed all naval shipyards to implement a Cost Schedule Control System. The
C/SCS idea was not a new one. The Department of Defense had required such a
system of all private contractors in its instruction 7000.2 of June 1977. NAVSEA's
primary goal in requiring C/SCS was to direct the shipyards to develop a system
which would provide accurate cost and schedule information so that line
management could use that information to improve cost control. Schedule
adherence had been a top priority for the past few years, often at the expense of cost
control. Therefore, though the system was for cost and schedule control, cost was
the primary concern. NAVSEA set December 1985 as the date for full
implementation of C/SCS at all shipyards.
The instruction defined ten basic criteria or principles which shipyards must
meet for their C/SCS to be approved. The principles focused on data collection,
work breakdown structure, performance measurements and means of resolving
deviations from planned performance. The system required collection of actual
cost and schedule data at the work task element level. Total projects were to be
broken down into small elements for ease in management. Actual cost and schedule
performance must be compared with planned cost and progress at the lowest level,
with deviations resolved by the responsible line manager. The information obtained
at the lowest level must aggregate to the total project. The third section of this
chapter will describe the criteria in greater detail and discuss Mare Island's
compliance in implementation.
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Under the cost and schedule control system the line manager holds ultimate
responsibility for portions of the project under his supervision. He is held
accountable for proper charging of costs as well as for execution of the cost and
schedule plans. NAVSEA noted the importance of line management involvement in
the budgeting process and in the development of the work breakdown structure.
Although principal requirements were laid down, there was no specific
guidance on the formulation of the system. Shipyards were directed to use existing
cost control and scheduhng systems and expand them to meet the new requirements.
Because these existing systems varied among the shipyards, each was allowed to
develop C/SCS to accommodate its current methods.
The brief instruction started motion toward developing C/SCS at the shipyards,
but NAVSEA found it necessary to expand its guidance and make some changes in
the general philosophy about the program. The December 1985 target for
implementation proved to be unattainable. Through a series of letters, NAVSEA
lengthened the time for implementation and reduced the scope of work to be
covered by C/SCS. Shipyards were now directed to implement C/SCS on all CNO
scheduled availabilities performed within the confines of the shipyard, beginning
with those starting after April 1, 1988. Also, the primary focus of the system was
changed from total costs to only direct labor costs. The ten basic criteria were
expanded and additional ones, concerning cost and schedule projections and internal
reporting and graphics, were added.
B. IMPLEMENTATION AT MARE ISLAND NAVAL SHIPYARD
The Shipyard Commander tasked the Production Control Branch with the
responsibility of choosing and implementing an appropriate system. NAVSEA had
directed the Naval Sea Systems Command Automated Data Systems Activity
17
(SEAADSA) to develop a C/SCS software package for installation in the shipyard's
existing Management Information System (MIS). Additionally, several commercial
software packages were available.
1. Selection of Software
Mare Island chose to implement the Artemis C/SCS for several reasons.
(Artemis is the brand name of a software package sold by Metier Corporation.)
First, the shipyard's mainframe computer which housed the MIS was already near
capacity without the addition of another major system. More importantly, the
decision makers believed the Artemis system best fulfilled the shipyard's
requirements. They felt Artemis provided the best turnaround time for reporting
and the flexibility to produce a variety of reports and graphics. They also believed
that the system could be expanded to cover indirect labor and material costs in the
future. In addition, the shipyard was already using Artemis software for scheduling
all regular overhauls so existing scheduling data would be compatible.
This choice resulted in one major weakness of the system. Artemis
scheduling and C/SCS information are gathered, calculated and stored on a Hewlett
Packard minicomputer that does not interface with the shipyard's Honeywell
mainframe computer. Timecard data, which is the basis for actual expenditures
used in C/SCS, is collected through the Honeywell based MIS. Thus, this
information is transferred from the mainframe to the Hewlett Packard by means of
magnetic tape. There have been difficulties in making this transfer with occasional
losses of data resulting. Retrieving the lost data to make a second transfer to the
minicomputer is so time consuming that the timeliness of the reports is severely
impacted.
2. Mare Island Added Objectives
In addition to meeting the NAVSEA requirements, MINSY listed two
other objectives for its C/SCS system. First, the reports were to be most valuable to
18
the waterfront managers. Secondly, the system should provide information to help
all management improve cost and schedule performance, making the shipyard more
efficient and competitive. The internal reports, which will be discussed later in this
chapter, were designed with these goals in mind.
Although this thesis focuses on the value of the cun-ent C/SCS to internal
shipyard management, the fulfillment of corporate direction cannot be ignored.
Indeed, many of the basic objectives required by NAVSEA facilitate the stated goals
of the shipyard. Studying Mare Island's actions to comply with those objectives
provides the clearest understanding of the current status of its C/SCS.
C. COMPLIANCE WITH NAVSEA CRITERIA
This section provides details of the current status of Mare Island's
implementation of C/SCS in terms of the NAVSEA required criteria. The
discussion is not all inclusive, but does present the most important developments to
date.
A brief explanation of the managerial and work hierachy follows. This
information is provided to define some terms that will be used in the remainder of
this section.
The managerial and work hierarchies are also called the organizational and
work breakdown structures. Table I below identifies the work levels from the
largest (ship) to the smallest (line item) element and shows the responsible manager
for each level.
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TABLE I. Work and Organizational Breakdown
Work Level Responsible Manager
Ship Senior Ship Superintendent
Key Event Project Management Team
Milestone General Foreman
Key Operations ( key ops ) Key Shop Foreman
Line Items Foreman
A normal ship overhaul consists of approximately 65 key events, 250
milestones and 6000 - 8000 key operations (key ops). The Project Management
Team is headed by the senior ship superintendent (usually non-nuclear) and consists
of the nuclear ship superintendent, nuclear and non-nuclear test engineers, combat
systems engineers and a type desk representative.
1. NAVSEA Criteria for C/SCS
Table II below lists the NAVSEA criteria for approval of a shipyard's
C/SCS. Many of the criteria are related and the discussion of Mare Island's
implementation is based on those relationships.
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TABLE II. C/SCS Validation Criteria for Naval Shipyards
1
.
Accurate Charging of Direct Labor
2. Physical Progress Assessment
3. Hierarchical Work Breakdown Structure
4. Hierarchical Financial Breakdown Structure
5. Line Management Acceptance of the Work Breakdown Structure
6. Line Management Acceptance of Budgets
7. Cost Performance Data Collection
8. Schedule Performance Data Collection
9. Performance Measurement Baselines
10. Resolution of Performance Variances
1 1
.





a. Direct Labor Charges
The first and seventh criteria, accurate charging of direct labor and
cost performance data collection, deal with direct labor cost charging. The
requirements are for accurate charging at or below the key op level. Cost charging
data is collected on the timecard and approved by the foreman. The individual
worker's labor is charged to a specific job order (line item) and identified with the
appropriate key op.
The shipyard has also established a procedure for charging excess
labor. If the foreman has more workers than he needs for jobs in progress, he is
required to send the excess to Work Center 29 where their labor is charged to Work
Center 29 overhead. The labor pool in Work Center 29 is used for plant and
property maintenance work normally accomplished by the Public Works
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Department. Because shop foremen are held accountable for exceeding the
budgeted overhead for their shop, they had often, in the past, charged excess labor
as direct labor cost to jobs in progress rather than to overhead. Work Center 29 was
designed to eliminate the charging of excess labor as direct labor without impacting
on the individual shop's overhead.
NAVSEA requires the shipyard to perform a statistical sampling of
direct labor charges to determine accuracy. The shipyard established an Internal
Review organization to perform this function and its findings are reported
quarterly to NAVSEA as directed. The findings are also reported to the Production
Officer for follow up and disciplinary action as necessary.
b. Physical Progress
The second and eighth criteria are physical progress assessment and
schedule performance data collection. Again, the requirements are for accuracy
and for collection at or below the key op level. The foreman uses the timecard to
indicate, in ten percent increments, the percentage completion of the job by line
item. Foremen have been instructed on how to determine the percentage of
completion. For jobs under three weeks or 500 hours duration, the foreman may
make an honest estimate. For larger key ops, the foreman is expected to break the
job into 10% increments and then determine percent completion of the job based on
the increments completed. Mare Island has charged the Progress Branch with
performing independent assessment of progress to insure accuracy. The findings
are reported to the Production Officer.
The foreman also notes any deviation from standard by using a letter
code that defines why work was delayed. For instance, the letter code tells whether
a delay was caused by a material problem, a technical problem or a delay while
waiting an assist trade. Such identification provides an analytical tool for later study
of actual performance against budgeted performance.
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c. Work Breakdown
Two criteria, three and five, require a hierarchical work breakdown
structure (WBS) that is accepted by line management. The first requires that work
be broken down to the line item level with successive aggregation to the key op, the
milestone, the key event and the total project in a manner consistent with standing
NAVSEA instructions on the subject. The shipyard was already in compliance with
those instructions. However, the Advance Planning division of the Planning
Department is now in the process of developing a Phase Oriented Key Operation
Numbering system (POKON) that is intended to better support C/SCS.
The second requires line management acceptance of the work
breakdown structure. Mare Island established a Industrial Planning Group to
afford interaction between the Planning and Production Departments in
determining the WBS. That group has since been disestablished so that there is not a
formal method for line management involvement in determining work breakdown.
d. Financial and Budget
Criterion four calls for a financial breakdown structure and criterion
six requires line management involvement in the budgeting process. Mare Island
was exempted from the first requirement of aggregating key op budgets to total
project budget because it conflicted with another required NAVSEA budgetary
procedure. Currently, Mare Island has no formal procedure for including line
management in the process for determining the budgeted number of mandays for a
given job.
e. Performance Measurements
Three related criteria, nine, ten and eleven require performance
measurement baselines (budgeted costs) from which cost and schedule variances can
be calculated, resolution of the performance variances, and revision of cost and
schedule projections, respectively. The criterion for performance measurement
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baselines specifically requires the use of budgeted cost for work scheduled
(BCWS), budgeted cost for work performed (BCWP) and actual cost for work
performed (ACWP) to determine variances according to the equations below.
Schedule variance = BCWP - BCWS
Cost variance = BCWP -ACWP
It should be noted that the shipyard in general, and specifically in the
development of these indicators and equations, uses cost and mandays as
synonymous terms. The cost indicators can be expressed in dollar amounts by
multiplying mandays by the stabilized manday rate. Mare Island uses the following
performance indicators for cost and schedule:
Cost Indicators
Earned Value Index (EVI) = Budget Mandays x % Complete
Actual Hours Expended
% ofBudget Estimated at Completion = 100
(Percent Budget at Completion) EVI
Estimated Actual Mandays at Completion = Budget
[also called Budget at Completion (BAC)] EVI
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Schedule Indicators
% Completed Each Day = % Complete
Today - Start Date
Estimated Time to Complete = IW.
% Completion Each Day
(1) Cost Indicators . The EVI is described as representing revenue
earned for expenses incurred to date. The shipyard line managers are taught that an
EVI of less than one indicates that less than a dollar is earned for every dollar spent.
The percent budget at completion represents a projected percentage of the budgeted
costs (mandays x stabilized rate) that can be expected if past work performance is
maintained. For example, if a ship's total EVI is .85, only 51 minutes of work is
being accomplished for every hour spent. It's percent budget at completion of 1.18
indicates that at the current level of efficiency, the final mandays used and final cost
will be 18% higher than budgeted. Line managers could multiply the BAC by the
stabilized manday rate to determine estimated actual cost to complete, but the
manday projections are more meaningful to them.
(2) Schedule Indicators . The schedule indicators assume the past
rate of completion will continue. Presently these indicators are only used for
finding schedule variances at the milestone level. Mare Island does not use BCWS
to calculate total schedule variance. They assume the budgeted schedule for
remaining work can still be met. The new projected end date is determined by
adding the remaining budgeted time to the estimated time to complete for the
milestone under consideration.
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(3) Variances . Actions taken by Mare Island to resolve cost
variances include the assignment of a Cost Analyst to each project under C/SCS and
biweekly meetings with all senior management to discuss the variances. Schedule
variances have not yet been studied for resolution. C/SCS data has not been used to
review or revise projected schedules or predicted end cost.
/. Training
Criterion fourteen requires the shipyards to provide effective training
to all levels of management. Mare Island contracted with ANADAC, INC. to
produce training material and to train shipyard personnel as instructors. Formal
training has been institutionalized for all first and second line supervisors and
nearly 1200 managers have been trained. Some middle and senior civilian and
military supervisors have been briefed on C/SCS but training material specifically
oriented to their needs has not been developed.
g. Other Validation Criteria
The remaining criteria deal with instructions, internal reports and
graphics. Mare Island issued its instruction 7000.3 Cost and Schedule Control,
Direct Labor in February 1988. There have been other instructions and policy
statements issued to clarify or expand on the information in the primary instruction.
Mare Island currendy produces reports formatted in organizational
breakdown structure and in work breakdown structure. These reports will be
discussed in detail below. Currently, the only graphics being produced are those
providing EVI and key op closure information.
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D. C/SCS INTERNAL REPORTS
This section identifies reports developed from C/SCS information that are
currently being issued and provides a brief explanation of the intended use of each.
The reports are identified by alpha-numeric code (CS Oxx) and title, and are
updated weekly. Table HI below summarizes the reports by number, user and the
level of organization or work.





















CS 007/8 Line Foreman Line Item





CS 002 Budget Rei)ort bv Milestone. This reoont is intended for use
Superintendent and Progressman. It provides information on the ship's overall
status including ship EVI, BAC, and Percent Budget at Completion. The report
provides the same performance information on the milestones of the project and
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identifies the key shop responsible for each. It also lists scheduled, projected and
actual start dates for each milestone.
CS 003 Budget Report by Key Event. Developed for use by the Shipyard
Commander, Project Manager and the Senior Ship Superintendent, this report
provides the same information as CS 002, but for key events instead of milestones.
CS 004 Budget Report by Shop . Used by the Production Officer and the Group
Superintendents, this report shows budgeted and expended mandays, percent budget
expended and percentage completion by shop. This information is used to develop
the EVI, BAC and percent budget at completion, which are provided for each shop.
CS 005 Budget Report by Milestone . This report repeats the data given in CS
002. However, it also provides the same information about the individual line items
associated with each milestone. Additionally, an estimated time to completion
variance and estimated completion date are provided for each milestone. The date
each milestone is closed to further labor charges is also listed. After that date, labor
charged to the closed milestone will be flagged by the MIS computer. The foreman
may correct the charge by inserting the proper job order number. If the foreman
fails to correct the charge within a specified period of time, the labor is
automatically charged to his shop's overhead by the computer. This report was
designed for use by the Milestone Manager (General Foreman) and the Key Shop
Foreman.
CS 007 (non-nuclear) and CS 008 (nuclear) Supervisors' Desk Top C/SCS
Worksheet. These reports are intended to provide working information for the line
foreman. The worksheet contains data and performance measures for each job (by
line item) scheduled to start in the next three weeks and for any job that has hours
expended against it. The information provided is meant to facilitate the foreman's
scheduling of workers and reviewing progress of the job. There is space provided
for the foreman to fill in his estimate of percentage completion of each job on a
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daily basis, giving him an easy reference for filling in the time cards later. The
report also notes the date that each line item was recognized as complete, indicating
that no further charges can be made against it.
CS 014 Budget Report by Work Center . The Shop Superintendents use this
report. It contains EVI, BAC and estimated budget at completion for each work
center within a shop.
CS 015 Budget Report by Group . This report provides the same information as
CS 014 but for each group of shops. This is used by the Group Superintendents and
the Production and Repair officers.
Other Reports. New reports are being created as users become more
comfortable with the system. Now that they understand the types of information
that can be provided to them, managers are requesting reports in specific formats
for their personal use. Reports are only distributed to those people who request
them. The current method of distribution requires the user to pick up the reports
from a specified location or make some other arrangement for their delivery.
In summary. Mare Island has made a diligent effort to implement a C/SCS that
conforms to NAVSEA requirements. The emphasis apparently has been aimed at
producing reports and training managers in their use. However, the validity of
some of the information presented in these reports seems questionable. Chapter IV
discusses the problems associated with the budgeted amounts used in the reports and
Chapter V will analyze the shortcomings of the resulting performance indicators.
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IV. THE COST ESTIMATTNG PROCESS
The process by which Naval Shipyards estimate costs for future repair work is
not standardized, but the basic steps are similar. The following description of the
process at MINSY is similar to the process at any of the eight Naval Shipyards.
A. COST ESTIMATING AND BUDGETING
The cost estimation procedure is very complex. A line diagram of the process
would bear more resemblance to a maze than an organization chart. Coopers and
Lybrand discuss this maze in some detail in their report (Ref. 4). The complexity
and potential problems in accurate cost estimating presented by the current process
are beyond the scope of this research and are not essential to a discussion of the
C/SCS. Therefore, a simplified form containing all the major steps will be
presented.
CONCEPT OF STANDARDS
A theme which runs throughout the discussion of cost control is standards . The
cost estimating process at MINSY is based on the application of a quantity standard.
The quantity is manhours. The origin of quantity standards dates back to the
industrial revolution when industrial engineers attempted to quantify standard
amounts of physical inputs necessary to manufacture specified products. In the
early 1900's the concept of standards evolved to include price standards.
Eventually cost standards, that is a quantity standard times a price standard for a
certain output, were also developed. These standards were all developed in the
manufacturing environment where there is a physical unit of production (output) to
be measured. The transportation of manufacturing standards to a non-
manufacturing environment like a shipyard is difficult. The difficulty arises most
notably from the lack of a physical unit of production by which output can be
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measured. The ensuing discussion of cost estimating must be considered in light of
the inherent difficulty of applying manufacturing standards to the repair industry,
in this case MINSY.
Before a meaningful discussion of the cost estimating process can be undertaken
there are some unique terms and constraints which must be addressed.
CLASS ESTIMATING STANDARDS
In the early 1980s, NAVSEA introduced the Class Estimating Standards (CES)
in an attempt to standardize and limit costs at the Naval Shipyards. The CES
pertains only to 637 Class submarines. These standards addressed manday estimates
at the Ship's Work Line Item (SWLIN) level for repair work only. SfflPALTS
were not included in the CES. (SHIPALTs are specialized work packages for
specific equipment or systems which are designed to improve operational
performance. They are not intended to achieve repairs as is the case with "repair
work.")
With representatives from each Shipyard in attendance, NAVSEA reviewed all
the SWLINs in a normal overhaul for a 637 class submarine. For each SWLIN, the
Shipyard representatives were required to identify their respective manday
estimates. These estimates were compared and NAVSEA selected one of these
manday estimates as the Class Estimating Standard for that SWLIN. At the
conclusion of this conference, NAVSEA collated the new standards and
promulgated the Class Estimating Standard for the 637 class submarines. Each
Shipyard involved in overhauling these ships received a copy and reviewed it for
achievability. This review provided an opportunity to conduct a more thorough
analysis of the Shipyard's ability to meet the standard than was available during the
standardization conference.
In those instances where an individual Shipyard's planners/management felt a
standard was unattainable, a revised manday estimate was submitted to NAVSEA
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for approval. All variations from the NAVSEA CES were controlled in this
manner. Thus, each shipyard is likely to have a variant of the CES. For example,
the NAVSEA CES for a particular SWLIN might have been based upon a resource
available in one or more Shipyards, but not available to all. (One Shipyard may
have a newer lathe which requires fewer direct labor hours per unit of output, or an
automatic vent cleaner which requires only one operator vice an entire cleaning
crew.) For those Shipyards which did not have access to this resource, a
proportionately larger standard would be appropriate.
Annual reviews of the CES are conducted by NAVSEA with corresponding
changes made as necessary. The total CES (aggregate of all SWLIN standards in the
baseline) provides the manday ceiling within which the Shipyard must complete
standard overhaul work.
The development of the CES does not fit into a classic description of task and
cost standardization for reasons discussed earlier. However, it provides a starting
point. Once the standard has been set, updates can be made as often as management
deems necessary. Whatisimportantis the establishment of a "standard". From this
foundation increasingly improved standards can be derived. Currently, there is
insufficient data relative to the standards used to provide any meaningful trend
information. As this data becomes available, a future analysis of the standards
chosen may be a worthwhile study.
BASELINE OVERHAUL
The baseline overhaul is one in which work actually accomplished is exactiy
as described in the Overhaul Work Package. The Overhaul Work Package is the
document which describes by SWLIN the work which a ship's Type Commander
wishes to have accomplished during the overhaul. This baseline is a nominal
overhaul and actually rarely occurs.
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There are two reasons why the actual overhaul differs from the nominal. First,
the baseline overhaul includes only repair work. There are numerous Ship
Alterations (SHIPALTs) which are accomplished during an actual overhaul. These
SHIPALTs account for approximately 25% of the mandays expended in an
overhaul. Second, approximately 30% of the OWP requires repair work that is not
specifically described. For example, "restore the fresh water system and test for
proper operation" does not enumerate the number of valves which should be
overhauled or replaced. Depending on the condition of the system being repaired,
the actual work required to "restore" the system can vary significantly. One
significant factor which causes varying equipment conditions is the operating
environment of the ship, i.e. warm water, arctic, etc. Because of security
restrictions regarding the operations of submarines, no such data has been available
to the shipyards for analysis. Therefore, there will normally be "growth" or "new
work" in any overhaul. This "growth" and "new work" may be the result of the ship
differences just discussed or equipment condition as described below.
GROWTH
This is an increase in the amount of work required to complete an equipment
repair. Growth is normally experienced in repairs where the condition of the
equipment is unknown prior to opening it for inspection. The CES is based on a
theoretical standard amount of work to repair, however, actual equipment condition
is usually worse than the theoretical standard. Growth work must be accomplished
to complete the equipment repair. The cost of growth work must be estimated in the
cost of completing the overhaul.
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NEW WORK
This is additional work discovered during an equipment repair which is not
directly related to the repair job. It may or may not be required to complete the
specific equipment repair, but usually does affect overall system restoration. If the
customer desires the work to be accompUshed then he must pay for it. As the cost of
New Work is bome by the customer, it is not estimated in the cost of completing the
overhaul.
STANDARDS FOR PLANNING SHIP OVERHAULS
Individual planners are required to identify the standards which they have
applied in their key op manhour estimates. There are four standards which are
used:
U Standard - A NAVSEA universal standard. It may have been a
particular Shipyard's E Standard (see below) or one that
NAVSEA developed internally.
E Standard - An engineered standard which has been developed at
MINSY.
A Standard - A planner's own estimate based on personal experience.
O Standard - A standard in name only. It is used only when none of the
above standards apply. It is the planner's best estimate
based on personal experience in related work.
The above standards are listed in order of their precedence. On average, 65% of the
estimates are based on "E" or "U" standards, 25% on "A" standards, and 10% on
"O" standards.
Note that these standards are applied at the key op level. The CES described
earlier pertains to SWLIN level work. The manhours estimated for the key ops
cannot exceed the CES for the SWLINs to which they aggregate. For example, if a
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SWLIN is authorized 1000 manhours by the CES and is comprised of 100 key ops,
the total manhours estimated for those key ops cannot exceed 1000. In order to
meet that 1000 manhour ceiUng, individual key op estimates must be adjusted so that
their sum does not exceed 1000.
Having identified the relevant terms a discussion of the cost estimating process
is now possible.
B. THE MANDAY ESTIMATING PROCESS
Ship overhauls are planned three to five years from the projected start date in
accordance with the Navy's ship overhaul plan maintained by NAVSEA. The initial
figures employed for planning purposes are very general and are used for workload
planning rather than cost estimation. The actual cost estimation process begins with
the receipt of the Overhaul Work Package (OWP). This OWP is initiated by the
Type Commander and lists all work (repair and SHIPALTs) required to be
performed during the overhaul. It is presented in an approved Work Breakdown
Structure (WBS).
The OWP is first reviewed by the Planning and Estimating Section (P&E). The
planners estimate manhour requirements for each SWLIN, by line item, in the
OWP. The total estimate cannot exceed the Class Estimating Standard for that
SWLIN. These estimates are then aggregated to the total repair estimate. This is the
"P&E Initial Estimate" in Figure 4.
It is important to recognize that this total repair estimate is an aggregate of
mandays required to accompUsh each individual line item in the OWP. The estimate
reflects the standards for individual SWLINs. It does not account for actual
mandays which will be affected by scheduling, delays, workman expertise, growth,
etc. Thus, it is only the aggregate of all SWLIN estimates, a benchmark planning
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figure, which must be adjusted by management to reflect the Shipyard's standards
for planned execution of the work package. This factoring is accomplished at two
levels.
1. Level One Factoring.
First, the "P & E Initial Estimate" is reviewed by the P&E Officer and
the Type Desk Assistant. The P&E Officer accelerates the original estimate by
factors provided by NAVSEA. These factors incorporate Navy-wide historical
growth into the estimate. This revised figure is called the "Should Cost Analysis
Record" (SCAR). It is NAVSEA's standard for accomplishment of the overhaul.
Simultaneously, the Type Desk Assistant accelerates the original P&E estimate by
two factors. First, a historical MINSY performance factor will be applied. This
figure accounts for all inefficiencies in the execution of the repair package,
avoidable and unavoidable, which have historically affected MINSY. The work
progress branch collects this performance data. Second, a growth factor reflecting
historical growth in repairs experienced at MINSY is applied. This data is
maintained by the Type Desk Assistant. The resulting estimate is called a
"Predicted End Cost" (PEC). The PEC represents the Shipyard's standard for
accomplishment of the overhaul. It cannot exceed the ceiUng established in the Class
Estimating Standards.
2. Level Two Factoring.
Thus far, there has been no allowance for performance variation among
shops. The above variations from estimates have been due to historical growth and
outside factors. In order to more accurately predict what an overhaul will cost, a
performance factor must be applied. These performance factors are maintained by
work center. Application of the performance factors, however, is not an automatic
process. A performance factor cannot be applied if the resultant budgeted mandays
(SCAR x Performance Factor) exceeds the PEC. Therefore, performance factors
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are limited to keep budgeted mandays within the PEC. These are the "Shop Level
Performance Factors" referred to in Figure 4.
The final step in the cost estimation process is the assignment of the
Shipyard Commander's Management Reserve. If the total budgeted mandays
is less than the number of mandays used to compute the PEC, and the difference
represents an acceptable management reserve, then no adjustment to the
performance factors assigned at Level Two is necessary. If the overall budgeted
mandays (SCAR x Performance Factor) equals the PEC and the Shipyard
Commander wishes to retain a management reserve then performance factors will
be adjusted as necessary to reduce budgeted mandays to a level which will support
the Shipyard Commander's desired management reserve. This final PEC then
becomes the shipyard's "Final Overhaul Budget" ( in mandays ).
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Figure 4. Manday Estimating Flow Diagram
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V. ANALYSIS OF THE C/SCS SYSTEM
This chapter will provide an analysis of the C/SCS system from the perspective
of its accomplishment of its developers' goals. Recommendations to improve or
correct problems noted in this chapter are contained in Chapter VII.
A. MINSY CONCEPT OF THE C/SCS
In its desk guide on the system, MINSY has stated four purposes for the C/SCS :
- to provide cost and schedule perfomiance indicators on key ops and line
items currently being worked on
- to allow the foremen and general foremen to take informed corrective
action
- to show the effects of corrective action while it is being taken
- to assure waterfront managers their assessment of the situation is being
provided to the shipyard's general management
The concept stated above does not elaborate on some basic questions. To whom
are the cost and schedule indicators to be provided? What are the decision needs of
management? Will the system identify only problems which are controllable by
appropriate management levels? Some assumptions will have to be made regarding
these questions.
This chapter will analyze the current system to determine if it fulfills these
goals as presently structured.
1. The Indicators
This section will review the accuracy of inputs and validity of uses for the
cost and schedule performance indicators.
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a. The Cost Performance Indicators
(1) Earned Value Index . The notion of an Earned Value Index, dollars
of revenue earned for dollars of costs expended , is an appealing one. The
underlying inputs to such an index must be valid, however, if the appeal is to be
justified, and the index must actually and accurately measure some quantity or
factor which managers can control for it to be useful.
The EVI inputs, as noted in Chapter IE, are budgeted hours, actual
hours expended and physical progress. Are they valid?
Budgeted hours are based on two components, the Class
Estimating Standards and shop Performance Factors. As noted in Chapter IV, the
Class Estimating Standards are not derived at the Shipyard, but are directed by
NAVSEA with only minor adjustments allowed. Moreover, the shop Performance
Factors used in the computation of budgeted hours are not the actual historical
Performance Factors. Thus, the budgeted hours reflect neither MINSY's
management standards nor accurate past performance. The basic measurement
mark, budgeted hours, has no real meaning in a cost control sense. It is not an
accurate benchmark.
Actual hours expended are submitted by the foremen. It is
imperative that these actual hours be accurately charged to the right job so that the
computer will credit them accordingly. MINSY has an internal review section
which audits direct labor charges for charging accuracy. Based on the most recent
audits, the internal review section estimates only about 70% of the direct labor
charges are accurate. The remaining 30% are mainly attributable to unintentional
error. There has only been one instance to date where disciplinary action for
intentional mischarging has been recommended by the internal review section.
The final input is physical progress expressed as "percent
complete". If a job is small, less than two to three weeks or 500 manhours, then a
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general estimate is satisfactory. This general estimate is strictly judgmental. If the
job is bigger than two to three weeks or 500 manhours, the foremen are supposed to
break it down into increments of work. These increments are defined by individual
foremen and are also strictly judgmental. The following example from the C/SCS
Desk Guide is a representative illustration of the method.
TABLE IV. Physical Progress Computation
KEY OP: Repair Four Vent Fans
Major Steps Budgeted M/H % Complete Cum%
Disassemble 100 17 17
Inspection and Report 20 3 20
Bake Stator 50 8 28
Groom Rotor 55 9 37
Replace Brushes 75 13 50
Replace Bearings 75 13 63
Reassemble 150 25 88
Test 11 13 101
600 101
The foreman must now translate the above work breakdown into
ten percent key op completion increments. The Desk Guide example provides the
following breakdown.
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TABLE V. Physical Progress in Ten Percent Increments
Work Description Cumulative %
Disassemble ( First 2
)
17








Reassemble ( First 2)













In the above example, the foreman would associate his percentage
completion in manhours with the nearest completion percentage by major step.
This will create some reporting problems as work progresses.
For example, the foreman estimated it would take 100 manhours
to disassemble all four vent fans and 20 hours to complete the inspection and report.
This 120 manhours accounts for twenty percent of his budgeted manhours and
correlates nicely with his computation of twenty percent physical progress.
However, consider that the four vent fans are disassembled at the time he reports his
physical progress, but he will not start the inspection until the next day. He has
expended 100 manhours and only completed ten percent of the key op. As derived
in the following equztion, this will give him an EVI of .60.
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600 M/H budgeted x 10% complete ^ 100 M/H expended = .60 EVI
If he completes the inspection and report within his twenty
manhour budget by the next day, his EVI will jump to 1.0. There was never a
performance problem here, only a reporting one. This problem will occur again at
the reassembly stage where reassembly is stretched over two increments. This
reporting problem will be increasingly evident in tracking longer key ops.
The figures in Table VI below are representative of key op
durations for ships in overhaul at MINSY. Based on these figures for ships
currently being overhauled at MINSY, 60% of the key ops extend two or more
weeks. Thus, more than half the key ops in an overhaul are vulnerable to this
reporting problem.
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TABLE VI. Key Op Durations
Duration Number Kev Ops % of Kev Ops Cum%
1 week or less 2678 38.0 38.0
1-2 weeks 1565 22.0 60.0
2-3 weeks 507 7.0 6.0
3-4 weeks 1045 15.0 82.0
4-5 weeks 101 1.0 83.0
5-6 weeks 478 6.7 89.7
6 - 7 weeks 34 .5 90.2
7 - 8 weeks 257 3.6 93.8
8-9 weeks 60 1.0 94.8
9-10 weeks 58 .8 95.6
10-11 weeks 21 .3 95.9
11 - 12 weeks 192 2.7 98.6
12-60 weeks 128 1.8 100.4
Another problem with the method employed for reporting
percentage of work completed is the use of ten percent increments. Such large
increments invite equally large variations in EVIs. In the example above, consider
the point at which the foreman has expended sixty three percent of his budgeted
manhours and has completed replacing the bearings. His real EVI should be one.
Does the foreman report sixty or seventy percent completion? His EVIs would be
as computed below.
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600Manhours Budgeted x 60% Complete = .96EVI
375 Manhours Actually Expended
600Manhours Budgeted x 70% Complete = 1.12EVI
375 Manhours Actually Expended
This sort of discrepancy will carry on throughout the overhaul. The problems
identified in this small key op will be magnified in key ops of longer duration where
the manhour percentages do not align as nicely with the major steps in a given
process. The ten percent increments are used because the C/SCS inputs are
transferred from the Shipyard MIS database which only allows a one field data
entry for physical progress reporting.
The above observations certainly cast doubt on the valididty of the
EVI as a performance indicator. The "budgeted hours" upon which they are based
are not a performance goal, labor charging is only 70% accurate, and the ten
percent completion reporting increments prevent smooth tracking of EVIs. This is
not to say that an EVI cannot be a valuable performance indicator. However, as
currently computed it is not. There is a benefit to the current reporting structure
which bears mention. The EVI receives high level attention at MINSY. As the EVI
becomes more important, the quality of the inputs from which it is derived will
probably improve. Eventually, charging errors will cease to be a problem.
Additionally, some of the institutional problems of work structure and work center
organization will disappear. At this point, the EVIs will be valuable as a data base
for trend analysis. They will still be of limited value themselves for reasons
discussed above, but these problems will be constants so the trend will be valuable to
management.
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We will assume that the structure of the EVI can be effectively
changed to produce an accurate perfomance indicator. The next question is whether
it is a valid cost peformance indicator. In order for the EVI to be a cost
performance indicator it must relate manhours expended with those budgeted hours
remaining as well as the overall overhaul schedule. Consider the above key op
example, again.
Assume the foreman has just completed baking the stator and is
reporting 30% completion. However, it took twice as long as planned to complete
this step so he employed an additional fifty manhours. He would have a .82 EVI.
Now consider that this fifty manhour inefficiency is not made up by exceptional
efficiency in another phase of the job. Because this fifty manhours will represent
an increasingly smaller percentage of the total manhours expended throughout the
job, the EVI will get larger (i.e., better) even though no improvement in




















TABLE VII. Physical Progress with One Instance of Work Slippage
Actual M/H








The EVI would have appeared to improve from .82 to .92. Since there is no
schedule data, the duration of this key op is unknown. It could range from a week
to three months or more. The point is that successive reports will indicate some
improvement where none has occurred, thus masking the need for corrective
action. In this case, the EVI was not useful in monitoring cost performance.
(2) % BAC. This figure is intended to indicate the percentage by
which actual manhours expended will be over or under budgeted manhours if
present performance continues. Since %BAC is the inverse of the EVI, the
problems noted above in EVI accuracy cast identical doubt on the accuracy of
%BAC. For the sake of further analysis of this figure, the same assumptions
regarding the ability to correct these deficiencies made above will be assumed here.
Accepting the above assumptions, can %BAC be an accurate or
useful projection of actual manhours to be expended? As a projection tool, %BAC
is basically a simple regression using one data point, manhours versus percent
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complete, and the slope represented by the %BAC. There are some obvious
deficiencies in such a regression. The most notable will occur in the early stages of
the overhaul. First, problems encountered in early work will inordinately skew the
regression line. Second, regression analysis is useful in explaining relationships
within a relevant range bounded by the data sets and not very useful in trying to
extrapolate these relationships outside the range. The two graphs below were
constructed from data contained in weekly C/SCS reports and represent reported
%BAGs for two ships at various percentages of overhaul completion.








Figure 5. USS ASPRO Percent BAG vs Percent Gomplete
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Figure 6. USS PARCHE Percent BAC vs Percent Complete
As these two graphs illustrate, %BAC figures are grossly exaggerated in the initial
phases of an overhaul. Even up to the 50% completion point, the figures still
project overruns in excess of 100%.
One reason which might help explain this inaccuracy is the shape
of the work curve. The graph of manhours expended vs. time expired is
curvilinear.
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Figure 7. Budget at Completion Computation Assuming Past
Performance Will Continue
The %BAC, as stated above, is a linear regression. This problem
will be discussed at greater length in Chapter VII. The point to be made here is that
%BAC is not a useful tool for predicting actual manhours required to complete an
overhaul.
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b.The Schedule Performance Indicators
(1) Estimated Completion Date. The estimated completion date is
computed in a three step process.
% Complete = % Completed Each Day
Work days between actual start date and today
700% Complete = Total Days to Complete
% Completed each day
Actual Start Date + Total Days to Complete = Estimated Completion Date
As stated in the MINSY C/SCS Desk Guide, "This prediction is
based on the present rate of completion continuing from today until the key op is
complete." The problem is that the computation does not produce a current
completion rate. It produces an aggregate completion rate to date. Thus, it does not
reflect current completion trends. Consider the example in Table VIII of a
ficticious key op with a ten week (50 working days) duration which started on D+1
.
In the third week only eight percent of the work is accomplished vice ten percent.
This slippage is not regained in the remaining seven weeks, however, the required
ten percent per week is accomplished.
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TABLE VIII. Completion Date Estimate with One Time Work Slippage
Work Days % Comp Total Days Est Comp
% Complete since D+1 each day to Comp Date
Weekl 10 5 2.0 50.0 D+50
Week 2 20 10 2.0 50.0 D+50
Week 3 30 15 2.0 50.0 D+50
Week 4 38 20 1.9 52.6 D+52.6
Weeks 48 25 1.92 52.0 D+52
Week 6 58 30 1.93 51.7 D+51.7
Week? 68 5 1.94 51.5 D+51.5
Weeks 78 40 1.95 51.3 D+51.3
Week 9 88 45 1.96 51.1 D+51.1
Week 10 98 50 1.96 51.1 D+51.1
Notice that the estimated completion date computed at the initial
work slippage was 1.5 days different than that which actually resulted. (Estimated
Completion Date at end of Week 3 is D+52.6. Estimated Completion Date at end of
Week 10 is D+51.1. 52.6 - 51.1 = 1.5 days.) In actuality, with progress being
reported in ten percent increments, this work slippage would never be evident until
the final 1.1 manday overrun was faced at key op completion. This is because the
work would be reported complete to the nearest ten percent increment. Therefore,
the Estimated Completion Date would always be D+50. The slippage would not be
evident until the key op was not closed out on time. At that point there would still be
1.1 days of production work required to complete the job.
52
Now consider Table IX with the same slippage in week three, but
this time it will be the start of a trend which will continue.
TABLE IX. Estimated Completion Date with Continuous Work
Slippage
Work Days % Comp Total Days Est Comp
% Complete since D+1 each day to Comp Date
Weekl 10 5 2.0 50.0 D+50
Week 2 20 10 2.0 50.0 D+50
Weeks 30 15 2.0 50.0 D+50
Week 4 38 20 1.9 52.6 D+52.6
Weeks 46 25 1.84 54.3 D+54.3
Week 6 54 30 1.8 55.5 D+55.5
Week 7 62 35 1.77 56.4 D+56.4
Week 8 71 40 1.78 56.3 D+56.3
Week 9 79 45 1.75 57.0 D+57
Week 10 87 50 1.74 57.5 D+57.5
The difference between the estimated completion date at the end of
the ten weeks for the trend slip is 6 days more than for the one time slippage. As in
the previous report, the ten percent reporting increments would cause even greater
confusion. If the foreman wanted to hide his work slippage, he could round his
completion percentages up to the nearest ten percent. The work slippage would not
be apparent until Week 9 when the work was actually five and one half mandays
behind. (Week 9 is the first week when the completion percentage could not be
rounded up to the expected level.) A report which accounted for current
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performance trends rather than an aggregated historical performance point would
be more useful.
(2) Estimate to Complete Variance. This figure is calculated as
follows.
Scheduled Completion Date - Estimated Completion Date = Variance
Notwithstanding the problem with the Estimated Completion Date which was noted
above, this variance factor should be accurate. However, the report does not
provide any indication of the criticality of unfavorable variances. If a foreman
wishes to regain his schedule he must incur more manhours (unless he finds some
extraordinary efficiency somewhere). These manhours will cost money and drive
his EVI down. It may be necessary to expend additional manhours to regain
schedule if the unfavorable variance affects a critical path in the schedule. If it does
not, however, it may be cost ineffective to regain the slippage. The decision to
regain schedule slippage is one which the foreman must make, but he is not provided
with critical path information. Thus, real time cost decisions cannot be made at his
level.
Additionally, the variance and its underlying estimated completion
date are subject to the same dependence on physical progress reporting which was
discussed as a problem with the EVI above.
2. Taking Informed Corrective Action.
In order to take informed corrective action, the monitoring system must
identify deficiencies which management can control and correct. The EVI
identifies variances between "budgeted" hours and actual hours. The "budgeted"
hours, however, do not represent a real management target. They have not been
derived from waterfront input, nor are they management's best estimate of expected
cost. Rather, they are a hybrid of corporate level standards ( NAVSEA acceleration
factors ) and a "least deviation" adjustment by the Shipyard. Moreover, they do not
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include the schedule component of the real costs the Shipyard will bear. Therefore,
the EVI identifies variances against an unreal target and only provides one part of
the information necessary to take informed cost control corrective action.
3. Showing the Effects of Corrective Action While it is Being
Taken.
There are two problems with the current system which hinder meeting this
goal. First, as discussed above, physical progress is only reported in ten percent
increments. This creates a reporting lag in longer key ops and reporting jumps in
shorter ones. Second, the C/SCS reports are printed weekly. Roughly 38% of the
key ops in an overhaul are completed in one week or less. Thus, the system does
not support tracking almost one half of the production work during an overhaul.
4. Waterfront Managers' Assessments Provided to Shipyard
General Managemept.
This goal is met at the bi-weekly cost review meetings. The senior line
management represent their line foremen in a discussion of current EVIs with the
Shipyard Commander. As stated earlier, the primary benefit of this senior level
review is the attention it brings to the inputs from which the EVIs are computed.
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VI. MANAGEMENT PERCEPTION OF C/SCS
A. SOURCE OF INFORMATION
This chapter identifies management attitudes, perceptions, and use of C/SCS.
As noted in Chapter I, personal interviews with managers at each level of the line
organizational structure were not possible. The authors were informed that
interviews with even one or two managers of each level would be costly in terms of
the use of their time. The authors considered attempting to arrange interviews
outside of the managers' working hours, but realized that such an arrangement
would require several more visits to Mare Island for which travel funds were not
available. Therefore, the majority of the observations discussed below are based on
information provided by staff managers who have been associated with the
planning, implementation and monitoring of the system.
Much of the information was obtained from interviews with Mr. Roy Burchell,
the senior cost analyst of the Comptroller Department. His knowledge of
management perceptions about the system stems from over two years of discussion,
observation and association with all levels of waterfront managers in their use of
C/SCS. Mr. Burchell also provided the authors a sampling of the results of a
recently conducted internal survey of line management understanding and
acceptance of the C/SCS. Only a small number of the actual survey sheets were
available, but we feel that some of the comments are worthy of mention.
The survey consisted of face to face interviews between members of the audit
team and the managers. Since support of C/SCS is mandated within the shipyard,
managers may have been prone to provide positive answers due to a lack of
anonymity. This potential bias should be considered when interpreting their
responses.
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The authors gained additional insight from interviews with staff managers
involved with the planning, implementation and monitoring of the system. They
expanded on the findings of the survey, providing their analysis of some of the
problems identified.
Finally, the authors attended two of the biweekly cost analysis meetings which
provided first hand observation of the attitudes of all levels of managers toward
C/SCS.
B. LINE AND STAFF MANAGEMENT PERCEPTIONS OF C/SCS
The survey results, discussions with staff managers and observations at the cost
analysis meetings support the discussion below. Four basic areas of actual or
potential problems are identified. They include concerns about report timeliness,
understanding and use of the system, charging accuracy and line management
acceptance of the system.
1. Timeliness of Reports
Distribution of reports was identified as a significant problem. As
previously noted, managers have to arrange to pick up copies of the reports they
desired. Additionally, although new reports are being generated, there is no
method of informing those who may be interested in the use of the reports of their
existence.
Line management receives C/SCS reports through hard copy distribution
on a weekly basis. Labor charging and physical progress data are collected daily
through the MIS mainframe. Line managers have access to remote terminals
connected to the mainframe and can readily retrieve information stored therein.
However, there are no remote terminals tied to the Hewlett Packard minicomputer
to offer online access to the C/SCS information. Further, since labor and progress
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data must be transferred by magnetic tape to the C/SCS computer, daily updates of
C/SCS reports are not made. Inability to access online data decreases the timeliness
and accuracy of the reports.
Every manager interviewed acknowledged use of one or more of the
C/SCS reports. Most indicated that they received the reports on Monday or Tuesday
of each week. A few said the reports arrived as late as Wednesday or Thursday and
one shop foreman complained that he had not received a report in six weeks. The
response of the latter foreman did not indicate whether he was unaware that it was
his responsibility to ask for the report or was aware and simply did not bother to
make arrangements to retrieve it.
2. Management Understanding and Use of the System
All shop foremen declared they had received training in C/SCS and the
majority felt the training was adequate. One indicated that more emphasis was
needed on understanding and using the reports. Middle and upper level managers
indicated the need for specialized C/SCS training for their benefit.
Relatively few of the Superintendents indicated their use of C/SCS to
identify cost and schedule problems. Those who did use the reports for that purpose
could only identify cost problems. None of the Superintendents felt they were
allowed input to the budgeted hours used in C/SCS.
All of the Group Superintendents supported the concept of Work Center 29
though some felt that there was a negative stigma associated with admitting to
having excess labor available. One said that his General Foremen were hesitant to
use Work Center 29 because it was often difficult to get their good men back when
work levels increased and their labor was needed. Most of the Shop Superintendents
said they had used Work Center 29, but primarily for light duty personnel. Only
one said that he sent excess labor there.
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The majority of the Superintendents understood that shop performance
factors were the primary difference between the SCAR and the C/SCS budget
figures. However, only one Shop Superintendent could identify his performance
factors.
The major problem identified by General and Line Foremen was
inadequacy in the Work Breakdown Structure. None felt they had the opportunity
to provide inputs to key operation structure. Line foremen indicated they often had
key ops that worked toward more than one milestone. They complained that lack of
involvement in the planning and estimating process required them to seek changes to
key op structure and budget allowances while the job was in progress.
3. Charging Accuracy
Group and Shop Superintendents indicated reliance on the Internal Review
division to enforce charging accuracy. A few used additional methods such as
weekly meetings and spot checks by their general foremen. Many Superintendents
said they used C/SCS reports to determine if their subordinates were reporting
physical progress. Others relied on general foremen to enforce physical progress
reporting.
Some possible causes of charging inaccuracies were identified by staff
managers. There exists a probability that line managers may feel coerced to
mischarge in order to boost their EVL Only one of the foremen interviewed
admitted to this type of pressure, but it is not unreasonable to expect that others are
subject to the same pressure.
There is also some indication that foremen intentionaUy mischarge in order
to avoid having charges applied to their overhead budget. Although overhead is not
controlled by C/SCS, it is the subject of close scrutiny and foremen are pressured to
remain within the budgeted amount. If a foreman feels the need to improve a
particularly bad EVI, there is room for some manipulation of the system. For
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instance, he could report a key op complete when there is still work remaining.
Then, his alternatives for charging the remainder of the work are to mischarge to
another key op or charge to the closed key op knowing that the computer will
eventually change that charge to overhead. But since he does not want to increase
his overhead, his best alternative is to mischarge.
The Internal Review division has uncovered a number of these intentional
mischarges. Those found to be intentionally mischarging are subject to discipline.
According to the head of Internal Review, past actions have been mild, usually a
verbal warning. However, Internal Review has taken a more active role in
monitoring the disciplinary actions with the intention of notifying the next line of
management if more serious discipline is warranted.
4. Management Acceptance of the System
Senior staff managers feel that C/SCS has generally been accepted by the
waterfront line management. However, there are indications that an increasing
number of managers are becoming disillusioned with the system. Managers are
beginning to realize that they are being measured against budgets and work
breakdown structures which have been developed without their input.
One of the most dominant topics of discussion at the biweekly cost analysis
meetings is closing key ops to charges. Weeks after a milestone is reported
complete, numerous key ops associated with the milestone remain open to charges.
The faulty work breakdown structure is the most prominent explanation given by
the foremen. There is an avenue available for the managers to have the key op
aligned to another milestone, but there appears to be growing resentment toward
having to take such actions. There are also complaints that problems identified are
corrected for the hull in process, but the same problems appear on subsequent hulls.
Inaccuracy in reports and unreasonable budgets are two other areas
mentioned by line management during the meetings. In defense of a particularly
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low EVI, one manager noted that there was a failure in the computer which he had
been attempting to have corrected for four weeks. Another manager indicated that
the manhours budgeted for his shop were far below the amount that had been
budgeted for the same work in the past.
The overall tone of the meetings showed defensiveness on the part of the
line managers being asked to defend their low EVI's to the Shipyard Commander.
There was also the feeling that an adversarial relationship existed between the
planners and estimators who prepared the budget inputs and the production line
managers who executed the plan.
There is increasing frustration among managers who, in good faith,
attempt to input accurate charge and progress data and then get back reports that
present an inaccurate assessment of performance. Upper level line managers are
most interested in the percent budgeted at completion indicator. However, they do
not feel that the figure is reliable until the overhaul is approximately half finished.
In conclusion, it appears that upper level line management are not totally
supportive of C/SCS. Their responses to the survey indicate that they do not fully
understand the system. Perhaps specialized training for them will increase their
awareness and support. However, these upper level managers may have enough
understanding of the system to recognize the arbitrariness of both the inputs and
outputs of the system. If so, it is unlikely that they will increase their support until
the problems are eliminated.
Lower level line managers seem to have a far better understanding of the
system. It seems that many of them readily accepted the concept and expected that
the system would be useful for them. Unfortunately, a trend of increasing
disillusionment with the system is now visible. If those managers who have been
striving to make the system work properly observe others manipulating it and not
being penalized, they are likely to discontinue their support.
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VII. RECOMMENDATIONS
The previous two chapters have identified myriad problems with the
implementation of the C/SCS at MINSY. This chapter will address
recommendations which the authors believe will provide a better cost/schedule
control system. These recommendations are made without regard to incremental
costs involved in their implementation. They are made strictly from an overall
system effectiveness standpoint in which the benefits are assumed to exceed the
added costs. The cost effectiveness of these recommendations is appropriately the
subject of additional thesis research. Additionally, the recommendations contained
in this chapter deal with direct labor only. Overhead and material control are
beyond the scope of this thesis.
The recommendations provided below are organized in the following
framework:
- Computer support for an effective system
- Improved estimating process
- Making the current reporting structure more useful
- Interfacing the current system with the overhaul schedule
A. COMPUTER SUPPORT FOR AN EFFECTIVE SYSTEM
There is an often noted tendency for managers to believe that any management
problem can be solved by a computer based information system. This has proven to
be untrue in many instances. Moreover, in those instances where a computer system
might actually be required, the actual system implementation has been inadequate.
The authors recognize both these verities. It is not blithely, then, that we
recommend an improved computer support system for MINSY. As will be
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discussed below, the type of information processing and presentation needed lends
itself ideally to the use of a computer. The general sort of capabilities and uses for
improved computer support will be discussed, however, no specific system or
equipment will be recommended. Such recommendations are more appropriately
made by persons with computer system and Management Information Systems
expertise. This is another area for further research which will be recommended
later in the chapter. The authors' intentions are to describe a scenario for computer
assisted decision making devoid of any particular hardware or software decisions.
The discussion of the recommended computer support system will be divided
into three categories: the data base, equipment capabilities, and reports.
1. The Data Base
The information stored in the data base should be complete enough and
structured in a manner to provide assistance in the following management activities:
- Workload forecasting (currendy available)
- Overhaul cost estimating
- Actual cost monitoring
- Real time work progress monitoring
a. Workload Forecasting
The system currently in use provides this capability. As this aspect of
Shipyard planning has no significant impact on the value of the C/SCS as a cost
monitoring tool, it has not been discussed in this paper. Therefore, no
recommendations are considered appropriate. This capability is mentioned here
because it supports the overhaul cost estimating process described below.
b. Overhaul Cost Estimating
Consider the following scenario. A ship is scheduled for an overhaul
at MINSY. The OWP is received. The P & E Section requests a computer run
estimating the cost of the overhaul. The computer provides an estimate, broken
down by milestone and key op, of the cost to complete the work identified in the
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OWP. All the required key ops will also be printed. Let us look at the data base and
its manipulation which made this estimate report possible.
The baseline OWP for 637 Class submarines is a function of both ship
age and position in overhaul cycle. (MINSY is primarily involved in overhauling
637 Class submarines. They will shortly overhaul their first 688 Class, but will
remain in the 637 Class overhaul business as their primary function.) The baseline
OWP for similar ships, then, is identical. These OWP work descriptions will be in
the data base. MINSY's scheduled workload will be in the data base. The available
manpower, historical work center performance factors
,
and MINSY's direct labor
standards will also be in the data base.
When the estimate is requested, the computer will first compare the
current workload with the manpower pool to determine which work centers are
available to acomplish the work. If there are inadequate resources available, an
algorithm to determine the number of additional workers required will be applied.
When the computer has identified which work center will perform the work, it will
accelerate the MINSY standards by the work centers' performance factors to
determine the actual mandays the work centers will require to complete the work.
(This step is intended to provide a more accurate manday estimate. A separate goal
of management would likely be to reduce all performance factors to 1:1 so that all
work centers meet the standard.) The computer can then generate a full list of key
ops, by milestone, with their manday/manhour estimates which truly reflect what
the Shipyard expects to expend in completing those jobs. This process will produce
a more accurate manday ( labor quantity) estimate than is currently achieved. This
more accurate labor quantity estimate may lead to a more accurate cost estimate as
decsribed below.
The computer may provide a more accurate cost estimate if the
manhour requirements in the data base are broken down by paygrade. Shipboard
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maintenance cards are broken down in this manner. Every key op could then be
costed at a standard worker rate for the actual paygrade expected to perform the
work in accordance with the standard. Such information could also be useful in
follow-on variance analysis to determine if unfavorable variances can be accounted
for in part by the use of higher priced labor than the standard allowed (labor price
mix variance).
In addition to the cost estimate, the computer can also print all the key
ops which are now prepared manually. It is not unusual for planners to duplicate
copies of old key ops and put the current ship's name on them. This is because the
work is so similar for ships of the same Class. This redundant effort could be
eliminated if the computer printed the key ops.
c. Actual Cost Monitoring
Monitoring costs by mandays provides an average direct labor dollar
estimate of expenses incurred. The payroll records collect timecard data by
individual worker. All direct labor charges must be made against an open job.
Therefore, the data exists to aggregate the timecard charges and produce a dollar
figure of direct labor dollar charges against all key ops. An aggregation of dollar
charges is currently compiled quarterly for reporting to NAVSEA. However, the
information is not routinely included in the C/SCS reports. The "cost" portion of
the C/SCS is reviewed in manday terms not dollars. Waterfront managers manage
people, not dollars. Yet their management of work assignments may lead to
unfavorable labor "mix" variances. The appropriate waterfront managers must be
sensitive to these mix variances as they assign work. Actual dollar monitoring can
allow the timely identification of cost overruns attributable to such practices as
using overqualified (and expensive) labor to accomplish work.
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d. Real time Work Progress Monitoring
As noted in Chapter Five, almost half of the key ops in an average
overhaul are of one week or less duration. Weekly reports offer no support to
management in monitoring work progress. What is needed is an online system
which can be updated at least daily to provide real time infomiation to the
responsible manager. The data base, then, must be capable of being updated by and
providing current information to online terminals. The mainframe computer does
have remote terminals throughout the Shipyard, but the C/SCS information is
processed on the HP 1000 which does not have remote terminal access.
2. Equipment Capabilities
The current system has three major failings. The mainframe does not have
sufficient memory to store the data base required above. The remote terminals do
not access the C/SCS software for data input and information retrieval. The C/SCS
and ARTEMIS scheduling systems are not linked directly to the mainframe. In
order to establish the ability to manipulate a data base as described above, a different
hardware system is needed. Whether that different system uses the current
hardware with expanded memory or all new hardware is not material. The point is
that there should be one mainframe with adequate memory. All computer support
should eminate from this central memory/data base. Waterfront managers (most
likely at the General Foreman level) must have remote terminals where their
subordinate managers can update work progress and they can retrieve timely
information to use in monitoring that work progress.
3. Reports
The fewer reports generated by any system, the less time taken reading
reports, and the more time available for managers to manage. This seems like a
reasonable maxim, but the sad truth is that report generating systems generally
swamp their users with reports. This is certainly true at MINSY. The list of titles
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of computer generated reports is almost three inches thick. There should be more
use made of selected dissemination of information. Perhaps a better phrase is
"exception reports". Managers do not need reports which are cluttered with
performance information on the work which has been completed since the last
report. Recall from Chapter Five that 44% of the key ops are one week or less in
duration. If the job is complete, it should not be reported on the weekly report. The
lower level line manager will know the status of his jobs by looking at his real time
terminal information. When a job is complete he no longer needs to track it. Senior
management does not need to wade through the work which has been accomplished
on time to find that which has not. All that is necessary is a listing of those jobs
which have not been accomplished on time—the exceptions.
In fact, if the waterfront manager has his real time updates, he should not
need any reports on the subject routed to him. These paper reports are valuable to
higher management levels which are not accessing the online terminals and are
conducting higher level reviews with a less than daily frequency. The reports must
be reclassified, then, to meet two criterion: management level of review, and
duration of work covered in the report.
Those reports which are disseminated must be done so in a reliable manner.
The current distribution system does not ensure all the waterfront managers get
their report copies. If senior management wishes to impress subordinate levels with
the importance of the C/SCS then it must take an equal interest in their receiving the
reports.
B. IMPROVING THE ESTIMATING PROCESS
Setting aside the question of manhours/days rather than dollars as an estimating
base, the current system for estimating resources required to complete an overhaul
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is still cumbersome and convoluted. An integral part of improving a cost/schedule
control system is the improvement of the underlying cost estimating process from
which the performance goals are derived.
1. Set a Shipyard Standard
In the parlance of the cost accountants and industrial engineers, the
standard is the standard. It is not a figure against which acceleration factors are
applied or any other manipulation is performed. The standards may be derived
from any combination of applied mathematics deemed necessary, but once they have
been derived they must stand as the benchmark until management refines them
further. There are too many standards in the Shipyard estimating process. What is
the Shipyard striving to meet, the P & E Estimate, the SCAR, or the PEC? A clear
standard must be developed. Moreover, for proper NAVSEA management, these
standards should be uniform for all eight Naval Shipyards. As was done for the 637
Class Estimating Standards, these uniform standards should be solicited from the
shipyards. Unlike the 637 Class Estimating Standards, however, there should not be
a different standard for each shipyard. As noted earlier, resources differ from one
shipyard to another so variances can be expected. The variances which can be
accounted for by resource differences are acceptable. It is the explanation of these
differences that is most important to management. The uniform standard, however,
will help to bring these acceptable variances to the fore so that the unacceptable ones
may be culled and addressed.
The authors recognize that the estimating process is dictated by NAVSEA
and that changing the process is not just a matter of the Shipyard deciding to do so.
In fact, obtaining the new computer support system discussed above may prove
easier than changing the way NAVSEA directs the estimating process be
accomplished. The C/SCS is an internal system, however, and it may prove
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beneficial to the Shipyard to implement a true cost estimating process with its own
standards for use in the C/SCS.
2. Measure Against the Standard
Once realistic standards have been established, all work can be measured
against them. It will be clear that the goal is to meet the standard, not which
standard.
Standards are used in industry as performance measurements. Against
which of the above "standards" are Shipyard managers being measured? Are
Shipyard managers being measured in terms of meeting performance goals? This is
another area in which the C/SCS can be used if the standards are supported by
management and realistic.
C. MAKING THE CURRENT REPORTING STRUCTURE MORE
USEFUL
As it exists, the C/SCS is very limited in supporting any control over the
Shipyard costs or schedules. The previous section identified improvements in
computer support which should enhance cost and schedule control. The next
section, dealing with interfacing the C/SCS reports with the schedule will add
another needed dimension. This section will address improvements to the current
reporting structure which will make it more useful as a monitoring tool.
Chapter V identified three major problems with the current C/SCS:
- Accuracy of Inputs
- Validity of Indicators
- Timeliness of Reports
Report timeliness has been addressed above. Accuracy of inputs and vahdity of
indicators will be discussed below. Additionally, a problem with the integration of
the C/SCS data collection structure and the Work Breakdown Structure will be
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discussed. This is a generic problem not associated with any particular aspect of the
report. Therefore, it was not discussed in the analysis in Chapter V.
1. More Accurate Inputs
As stated in Chapter V, the inputs used in the C/SCS are budgeted hours,
actual hours expended, and physical progress. If Shipyard standards (as described
above) are applied as the "budgeted hours" for the C/SCS, then the accuracy of this
input is no longer in question. Recommendations for the remaining two inputs
follow.
a. Actual Hours Expended
The audit process for direct labor charging appears to be adequate. It
is imperative that fraudulent charging be dealt with effectively and accurate
charging be emphasized. The current level of charging accuracy, 70%, is not
considered adequate to support a meaningful C/SCS. Charging accuracy should be
a performance category measured in managers' evaluations. With appropriate
management attention, the charging accuracy should improve.
b. Physical Progress
"1 There were three major concerns with this input. First, there is no
standard measurement system for reporting physical progress. Second, the current
computer system only allows reporting physical progress in ten percent increments.
Third, there is no effective audit procedure for physical progress reporting.
There must be a standard means for reporting physical progress. This
is necessary so that supervisory management levels can compare progress in
different work centers and be confident that the reported completion percentages
reflect the same amount of actual progress. Also, it must serve as a common base
for an effective audit program. This standard reporting process need not be
standard throughout the Shipyard, but must at least be standard within shops.
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Ten percent reporting increments are inadequate. The current
software should be modified to allow for reporting in unit level increments. This
will be particularly important if an online system is employed, and daily progress
information is available.
The physical progress "audit" procedure currently employed consists
of progressmen evaluating a total of ten key ops each week. There are two
problems with this system. First, ten key ops is not a statistically significant sample
from a population of roughly 28,000( 4 ships x approximately 7000 key ops/ship).
Second, the progressmen are not considered qualified to contest the physical
progress reported by the foremen. ^
The audit program needs to be improved in these two areas: conduct
statistically significant sampling, and use qualified progressmen whose assessment
of physical progress will be considered accurate.
2. More Valid Indicators
The indicators reviewed in Chapter V were the EVI and %BAC. For the
sake of this discussion, it will be assumed that the recommendations for improving
the accuracy of the inputs to these indicators have been adopted. The remaining step
is to make them more valid.
a. EVI
There must be a method for distinguishing between one time
inefficiencies and inefficient trends represented by an EVI. This can be
accomplished by tracking the difference between the manhours allowed for the
percentage complete reported and the actual hours expended. Recall the example in
Chapter V, restated in Table XI below.
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TABLE XI. Physical Progress with One Instance of Work Slippage
% Complete
M/HAUowed
for % Completed Initial Inefficiency
AcnialM/H
Expended EVI
30 170 50 220 .82
40 225 50 275 .87
50 300 50 350 .86
60 375 50 425 .85
70 - - - -
80 450 50 500 .96
90 525 50 575 .94
100 600 50 650 .92
The initial inefficiency will recurringly appear as the difference
between the manhours allowed for the percentage completed and actual manhours
expended. Now consider an example where a negative perfonnance trend exists. In
the example shown in Table XII below, the foreman will start to lose ten manhours
per week beginning with the 30% completion report.
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A Btwn M/H Allo^
and Expended
30 170 220 .82 10
40 225 275 .87 20
50 300 350 .86 30
60 375 425 .85 40
70 - - - -
80 450 500 .96 50
90 525 575 .94 60
100 600 650 .92 70
This example clearly shows the inadequacy of the EVI in highlighting
a downward trend in performance. However, the final column makes the trend
obvious. To facilitate the stand alone use of the report, an additional column which
indicates the difference since the last report would be helpful.
b. %BAC
The problem with the %BAC is that it is a straight line projection of a
curvilinear function. This can never be a reliable projection tool. The basic
assumptioon behind using the reciprocal of the EVI to project %BAC is that present
performance will continue. This seems to be an unwarranted assumption,
particularly if management is doing its job and taking effective corrective action.
The more appropriate projection would be to project the work curve from the

















Budget at Completion = 150 Manhours
% BAG = 150/140 = 1.07
WEEKS
Figure 8. Budget at Completion Computation Assuming Past
Performance Will Not Continue
The graph in Figure 8 above demonstratess the projection of a %BAC
if the assumption that past performance will not continue, but that its effects will
remain. The .80 EVI represents 50 manhours expended at the end of week two
rather than the 40 manhours allowed. The current method of computing %BAC
would project a 25 percent overrun (100-5- 1.25). The graph shows that a seven
percent overrun is more likely when the unwarranted assumption is dropped. This
makes sense since the ten additional hours expended represents seven percent of the
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140 manhour total for the key op. Thus, a simple and more realistic method of
computing %BAC is just to compute the current overrun and aggregate it
throughout the job.
3. Integration with the Work Breakdown Structure
The basic problems in the integration of the C/SCS with the Work
Breakdown Structure are keyop sequencing and aggregation to milestones. Both
these areas are recognized as problems by the cognizant personnel at MINSY. A
new program. Phase Oriented Key Op Numbering System (POKONS) is aimed at
correcting the problems with the sequencing of key ops. Resolution to the problem
of key ops not aggregating to discrete milestones is not yet defined. The Industrial
Planning Group was working on this problem, but when it was disbanded all the
data collected was discarded. This is an area which needs prompt attention if the
C/SCS is expected to provide performance information which will "roll up" from
the key op level to the total overhaul.
D. INTERFACING THE CURRENT SYSTEM WITH THE
OVERHAUL SCHEDULE
Perhaps the most critical shortcoming in the current C/SCS implementation is
that it does not provide any interface between the manhour expenditures and the
overhaul schedule. This is important because key ops on the schedule's critical path
with low EVIs will cost more to complete than those not on the critical path. Once a
key op's EVI has dropped below one, it will cost more than budgeted to complete.
However, if that key op is on a critical path then additional expenses must be
incurred to regain the schedule slippage. Additionally, key ops not originally on the
critical path may become critical if their slack is exceeded. These are two real
concerns which the C/SCS must address.
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1. Identify Kev Ops on the Critical Path
There should be a separate report for tracking critical path key ops. This
report periodicity should reflect the duration of the applicable key ops, i.e., semi-
weekly for one week key ops. Senior management must track all critical path key
ops. If daily reports are required, so be it. The online system described in the
beginning of this chapter must also provide some means for identifying which key
ops are critical.
2. Watch Kev Ops that Mav Define a New Critical Path
In those key ops not on the critical path, there should be some prescribed
amount of slack which can acceptably be used before flagging management
attention. When that point is reached, management will have to take some action to
prevent the remaining slack from being used and moving that key op onto the
critical path. This slack percentage should represent a remaining time period in
which management will have the opportunity to note and react to the slippage. The
exact percentage will be a function of key op duration, slack time, and report
periodicity.
E. SUMMARY
The purpose of this thesis was to answer the questions posed in Chapter I. The
following findings are summarized.
1. Current Status of C/SCS Implementation at Mare Island Naval
Shipyard.
A system is implemented which conforms to many of the NAVSEA
requirements. Emphasis has been placed on training and report generation. This
status is discussed in Chapter EI.
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2. Direct Labor Estimation
MINSY employs a complex procedure with multi-stage adjustments to
estimate direct labor requirements. This process is described in Chapter IV.
3. Input Data Accuracy
Inputs to the C/SCS are not accurate. The problems associated with data
accuracy are presented in Chapter V.
4. Validity of Performance Indicators.
Performance indicators are not valid. Inadequacies of the indicators are
discussed in Chapter V.
5. Usefulness and Timeliness of Reports.
The reports generated by the C/SCS do not provide particularly useful or
timely information. This problem is discussed in Chapter V.
F. CONCLUSIONS
Restated in operational terms, the Cost/Schedule Control System implemented
at MINSY has five major shortcomings:
1) The system is intended to assist management in controlling costs and
schedules, but does not present information within the context of the
cost/schedule relationship.
2) The current Work Breakdown Structure does not support the framework
of the data collection system.
3) Adequate auditing procedures are not in place to insure accurate data
input.
4) "Costs" are monitored in average labor dollars (mandays) rather than
actual labor dollars.
5) The underlying cost estimates do not provide meaningful management
goals.
The first flaw is largely a function of the system having been adapted from the
contracting world. The C/SCS was designed for a program manager to assess
contractors' abilities to meet required acquisition milestones. As can be seen from
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this thesis, the system does not directly lend itself to application in an environment
where the user is actually trying to control costs rather than monitor expenses and
schedules. One of the more obvious problems in transferring this system to
shipyard management is in the failure of the Work Breakdown Structure to support
it.
The final three flaws all relate to the Shipyard's historical attention to schedule
rather than costs. The use of mandays as a "cost" figure, lack of audit procedures
for physical progress reporting and the circuitous manhour estimation process all
reflect a system designed to provide a stable long range planning environment for
the customers rather than sound financial management for the Shipyard.
The current C/SCS is really not very useful in identifying or controlling costs.
What it has done, however, is to highlight the above flaws so that they may be acted
upon. With continued cost consciousness support from NAVSEA these flaws can be
corrected.
Costs may never subsume schedule in the operational world. Long range ship
employment plans are made based on overhaul schedules. The Navy's ability to
respond to tasking with sustained presence is dependent upon the adherence to
schedules. What may well come of the hightened interest in overhaul costs,
however, is an appreciation for the real cost of customer induced schedule
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perturbations. Perhaps when faced with a million dollar bill for emergent repairs
the Type Commander will accept some reduced capability for the interim prior to a
more normal repair cycle when costs may be half that amount. Additionally,
Congress may not be so quick to expect immediate tasking response when the ability
to present them with an immediate bill for maintenance costs is available. In the
long run, then, perhaps the most that can be hoped for this sytem is to heighten cost
awareness at all levels of the Navy and Govemment.
G. AREAS FOR FURTHER THESIS RESEARCH
1. Computer Support Systems for Naval Shipyards
Future research might explore an appropriate system for use in the full
implementation of the C/SCS as described in this chapter.
2. Cost Effectiveness of Recommendations Contained in this
Thesis
Another study could determine the cost effectiveness of procuring the type
of computer system recommended in this chapter, or one which might be
recommended in the thesis above.
3. Actual Dollar Cost Performance Monitoring in Naval Shipyards
An exercise that could prove extremely beneficial would be to construct a
periodic reporting system which would track the actual dollars expended in the
overhaul of a ship at MINSY and compare that system with the C/SCS. The
objective would be to compare the two and determine which provides a better
management tool for controlling costs.
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